The challenging elections of 2000 triggered electoral reforms across many states, though the scope and depth of these reforms varied widely. While political scientists have begun to understand the correlates of race politics, and state policy making in general, much less attention has been paid to these relationships and electoral reforms. In this paper we examine the impact of politics, ethnicity, and fiscal health in leading states to pass electoral reform legislation. Using state level data from 2001 and 2002, we find that partisan electoral balance played a recurrent role in the passage of electoral reforms. States with a divided government or high levels of party competition were averse to reforming several key electoral reforms. Also, partisanship and the interaction of partisanship and minority representation influenced selected electoral reforms.
Despite the expectations and intent of HAVA, states undertook quite dissimilar paths of electoral reform, both before and after HAVA. In part this may be the result of a greatly delayed leadership role from Washington. For example, the Senate only approved the four members of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission in December of 2003, close to 10 months behind schedule. 3 In addition, the legislation finally passed in HAVA allows the states much discretion in their final implementation of the law, in and of itself promoting a differential path of reform while raising some concerns about lack of consistency in state electoral legislation. 4 For example, the much-maligned punch card ballots have actually not been banned by HAVA, but states can choose voluntarily to replace these systems with the help of federal funds. 5 In terms of voting standards, while one of HAVA's goals is to improve the uniformity of voting standards, the Election Assistance Commission will only provide states with voluntary guidelines. In fact,
states still have the discretion to define what constitutes a legal vote for each type of voting machine.
In short, although a good deal of new legislation has been passed, no panacea has yet been applied to the ills that the state-level and HAVA electoral reforms were presumably intended to address after the 2000 election.
3 As a result of this delayed appointment, the distribution of federal reform funding was also held up, and only $2 million of the promised $10 million was allocated for the operations of the Commission. So the question remains, why did some states actively reform their electoral systems, engaging in early-on and costly reforms, while others did not? The goal of this paper is to explain variation in state election reform after the 2000 election, with an emphasis on the fiscal years 2001 and 2002 (before HAVA) though we also examine the reforms after HAVA. Were
Democrat controlled states more likely to pass reforms that increased accessibility to vote? Did
Republican controlled states tend to favor stricter voter eligibility rules? Were states under fiscal stress more reluctant to pass reforms? Answering these questions should contribute to our understanding of institutional change and enfranchisement at the state level.
We begin by conjecturing that state election reform was not driven simply by the current state of the election administration. On the one hand, the large literature on state policy making tells us that state legislatures have been responsive to an array of internal characteristics, including quite importantly political and electoral constraints (e.g., Barrilleaux 1997, Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002; Berry 1992, 1999; Hero and Tolbert 1996; Sabatier 1999 ). On the other hand, the literature on turnout and voter mobilization has revealed that expanding the electorate is not simply a random expansion of the voter pool but demographic, and sometimes partisan, shifts can occur (Brians and Grofman 2001; Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; Highton and Wolfinger 1998; Leighley 1996, 1999; Knack and White 2000; Martinez and Hill 1999; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) . This suggests that election administration should be a highly politicized policy area to reform. Furthermore, the last major national reform of voter eligibility and registration before 2000, the National Voter Registration
Act of 1993 -the so-called "motor voter" act -was widely interpreted in partisan political circles as having a pro-Democratic bias. Previous research on state level policy-making has shown the need to control for baseline levels or demand for reform (Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer 2002; Berry 1992, 1994 This literature showed that punch card ballots and some other ballot forms and electoral procedures are likely to produce a larger percentage of residual votes than other systems. The
Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project has estimated that between 4 and 6 million votes are typically lost in presidential elections, and that 1.5 to 2 million of those are due to faulty equipment and confusing ballots, 1.5 to 3 million due to registration mix-ups, up to 1 million due to polling place operations, and an unknown additional number due to the way absentee ballots are administered.
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The quality of voting equipment and its interaction with the ethnic and racial makeup of the electorate have also been the subject of a large amount of research. Whether or not Hispanic and black voters were in fact likely to live in precincts with inferior error-prone voting technology, after election 2000 there was a widespread belief that this was true (Knack and Kropf 2002) . More to the point, the evidence seems clear that minorities are more likely to cast invalid ballots than are whites when they use punch card or centrally optically scanned ballots (Buchler, Jarvis, and McNulty 2004; Tomz and Van Houweling 2003 Hypotheses 5: Legislative Style. We expect more professional legislatures to move early toward changing their electoral system than less professional legislatures. Not only are the more professional legislatures more likely to be innovative, but the more professional the staff and the more established the committee structure (two elements of legislative professionalism) the more able the legislature is to begin to address reforms. More professional legislatures are more likely to be informed about innovations and options considered in other states, and to the extent that greater professionalism is associated with higher incumbency rates, legislators in more professional legislatures may be better able to calculate the costs and benefits of innovation in the electoral system (Berry, Berkman and Schneiderman 2000; Squire 1988 Squire , 1997 .
Changing the rules concerning registering, voting and counting of ballots carries a risk to legislators. Some changes might follow the "law of unintended consequences," while also in 
Data and Methodology
We collected data on all state electoral reforms after the 2000 election in 4 critical areas:
new voting equipment, improved registration lists and purging procedures, provisional ballots, and voter ID. 18 We consider only major reforms, following the National Conference of State Legislature's assessment of comprehensive reforms. For example, many states introduced legislation planning for new equipment but fewer states passed laws actually committing to new purchases. We also collected data on which states passed laws specifically targeted to comply with some of the requirements of HAVA, after HAVA was passed. The dependent variables in subsequent analyses consist of a discrete variable ( 
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Racial Factors. We conjectured above that states with higher percentages of minorities would be more likely to enact a reform, and we also conjectured that we would find partisan and specific minority interactions. There were a variety of possible indicators to choose from to capture the potential minority vote. After some analysis, we decided that the use of a combined (Figures 1c and 1d ). In general, the effect of divided government seems stronger on those reforms that can expand the size and composition of the electorate.
( Figures 1c and 1d about here.)
In terms of partisanship one of the strongest correlates with reform across all four types is the interaction of party control and minority representation, specifically Hispanic representation.
Among states with a large percentage of Hispanic population and Republican control (7 states), 42 percent passed new voting equipment laws and 57 percent passed provisional ballot laws, much higher rates than the overall rate of passage among all states. On the other hand, among these states, no voter ID laws were passed, while overall 20 percent of all states did so.
Although suggestive, these preliminary analyses, focusing mainly on political and racial factors, do not simultaneously control for all the covariates that we think should be controlled for when predicting passage of electoral reforms. In the next sections, we account not only for racial and political factors but also base level needs for reform and fiscal constraints.
Results
For each electoral reform we estimate a discrete choice specification (probit) predicting the probability of passage given our hypothesized covariates. Beginning with new equipment and provisional ballot reforms, the first two reforms in Term limits did not have a statistically significant impact on either equipment or provisional ballots reforms, and was after initial analysis excluded from the models.
In summary, for equipment and provisional ballot laws --reforms with the potential to expand the electorate --the largest and most consistent effects are associated with party balance.
Politically competitive states were disinclined to pass legislation to mandate new equipment and states with a divided government were less likely to pass provisional ballots. The effect of racial politics was also present though not in a consistent manner across reforms.
Our next set of electoral reforms concerns "voter barrier" electoral reforms: improved registration lists and voter ID. As seen in Table 1 , the fit of the models as measured by the pseudo-R 2' s of 0.38 and 0.47 suggests our specification is again capturing systematic variation.
The effect of the baseline control implies that states that already had mandatory ID requirements were more likely to pass laws tightening ID requirements. Election 2000 may have prompted these states to restrict access even more. The baseline for improved registration lists is not statistically significant.
The analyses in Table 1 show that, as with electorate expanding reforms, certain racial Focusing next on political variables, party balance and partisanship (Democratic) have a strong effect on registration laws, while only partisanship (Republican) has a strong effect on voter ID. States with divided government were 0.76 less likely to pass tighter registration laws and states with historically higher levels of party competition were 0.57 less likely to do so.
Furthermore, and for the first time in our specification, Democratic control has a strong negative and statistically significant effect by decreasing the chances of passage of improved registration by 0.78 points (p-value of 0.02). In the case of voter ID laws, it is only Republican control that has an effect on its passage (p-value of 0.06).
Last, none of the state fiscal and institutional variables achieves statistical significance at the 90 percent level, while term limits again did not achieve statistical significance, and is not included in the models.
In general, the only common factors influencing both voter barrier reforms were partisan concerns. States under Democratic control were less favorable to improved registration laws while states under Republican control were more favorable towards stricter voter ID reforms.
Party competition and racial politics had a selective effect: they mattered mainly for improved registration laws, though in a strong manner.
Our analyses of electoral laws post election 2000 reveal that the influence of state politics in shaping the new reforms goes beyond simple baseline needs for reform. However, only electoral balance seems to have a strong effect across several of the reforms, while racial politics seem to play a more selective and inconsistent role, depending on the reform. A natural question that arises regarding these reforms, and which we have not yet addressed, is the joint level of significance of our hypothesized factors across reforms, and more generally, the level of interdependence across electoral reforms. Our initial modeling specification posits four separate processes, while these processes may be interrelated or alternatively, they may be part of the same process. To address these questions we created a summary index of reform and reexamined our hypothesized factors.
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There are different ways to aggregate electoral reforms. An index that simply captures levels of activity in reform or numbers of reforms is highly problematic since as shown in the previous section there are distinct partisan valences to each reform that can operate in opposite directions. Instead, we constructed an additive index that measures the increased level of restrictiveness of a state's electoral law based on their activity in the four types of reform. The index has 5 categories and goes from -2 to 2. An index value of -2 corresponds to those states which passed the least restrictive reforms, new equipment and provisional ballot laws, and an index value of 2 corresponds to those states that passed both registration and voter ID reforms, the most restrictive reforms. 26 Such an index preempts the ability to find separate effects for each area of reform, which we believe is necessary, and it introduces a degree of noise, but on the other hand, it allows one to examine overarching influences and interdependences along a constructed dimension of reform.
( Table 2 about Overall then, the best predictor of HAVA passage is the level of professionalism of state legislatures, and, possibly, partisan control of the state. The fact that racial politics plays essentially no role in the passage of HAVA may not be that unexpected after all given that HAVA addressed or suggested guidelines on many electoral law reforms areas at once. As such, 27 The reader may have noted that the interaction of Percent Hispanic and Republican control is not included in the model. This is due to the fact that when having this interaction, as well as the interaction for percent Black, the coefficients and their standard errors cannot be computed due to multicollinearity.
HAVA and First Steps towards Federal Compliance
the potential association between minorities' representation and partisanship may get attenuated due to the different concessions made in the passage of HAVA.
Conclusion
The hotly contested 2000 election exposed major flaws of the electoral systems in many states, providing us with a historically unique opportunity to examine how these states responded. The goal of this paper was to examine the determinants of passage of state electoral reforms. We analyzed state electoral reforms across an array of legislative areas that had not been previously comprehensively addressed. Examining electoral reforms separately and through a summary index of reforms, we found that state legislatures took into consideration the electoral balance and the potential electorate when enacting electoral reforms, as opposed to responding simply to internal state needs for reform or being constrained by state fiscal health.
Using state-level data of electoral reforms from 2001 and 2002, we found that a tight electoral balance, as measured by either party competition or divided government, had a negative effect on the passage of three of the four electoral reforms examined, and states with a divided government had, all else equal, a more restrictive index of overall electoral reforms.
Furthermore, we found some evidence of a strategic linkage between Republican concerns and Hispanic representation, in particular regarding registration laws, while, in general, Republican controlled states with higher percentages of Hispanics in the population had, all else equal, a less restrictive index of reforms.
Our findings are directly relevant to studies of state policy-making, party electoral strategies and representation. Previous research on state policy-making has found that policies enacted by states can be shaped by factors other than internal constraints such as fiscal resources or legislative professionalism. In fact, this line of research has shown that legislative state politics, reflected for example in measures of party competition, party control, or the electoral cycle, can affect state policy-making (Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer, 2002; Barrilleaux 1997; Berry, 1990, 1992) . More specifically, previous research suggests that more politically competitive states will produce more liberal policies, while states with a divided government will have a higher number of policy conflicts between the governor and the legislature, and will be slower to react to fiscally Barrilleaux, 1997; Gray and Hanson, 2004; Clarke, 1998; Holbrook and Van Dunk, 1993) .
Our analyses are in agreement with the general expectation that legislative politics should shape states' policy, including electoral law policies. However, the results obtained in this study also highlight the potentially distinct nature of electoral law reform. For this policy area, we find that when examining electoral reforms separately, higher levels of competition do not always ensure more liberal electoral reforms and can actually hold back reforms in general. Moreover having a divided government, another measure tapping into party competition, corresponds overall to a more restrictive index of electoral reforms. These results suggest that having a tight electoral balance may translate in the policy area of electoral law reform into less reform or less liberal reforms. In contrast to other policy areas where state legislators (or the governor) may seek to garner votes through policy redistribution, electoral law reform is a distinct policy area in which state politicians can actually influence who those voters might be. As such the exact relationship between legislative politics and electoral law policy-making may not be the same as for other policy areas.
The picture of post 2000 electoral reform that emerges, then, is one of states and state legislators being risk-averse yet also strategic decision makers. We believe that the continuing electoral law reforms being conducted by the states will provide more and extended Table 1 . Highlited are those probabilities that are significantly distinct from zero at least at the 90% level.
Appendix C. Alternative Model Specifications and Robustness
Motivated by previous empirical findings and literature, we also tested for other model specifications, as well as conducting general robustness tests. In terms of alternative model specifications, we tested for diffusion effects and regional effects, as well as thoroughly examining for alternative specifications, in particular regarding the political variables, interactions, and the presence of the baselines. The effect of southern states is often examined in state policy research with the understanding that this geographic area may have a distinct history and culture that is not captured with our standard ideological or socio-economic controls. Including an indicator for southern states (10 states), does not achieve statistical significance in three of the area reform models and the HAVA model, and only achieves statistical significance for the model on improved registration lists, with southern states, all else equal, being less likely to tighten their registration databases (p-value 0.05), however, substantive interpretations from the model remain unchanged. Furthermore, the indicator for southern states has no statistical impact on the overall index of reform model (p-value 0.51). We believe our models are sufficiently fully-specified, as well as motivated by empirical and theoretical findings in state policy making, to not warrant such aggregate regional specification.
We also considered reduced form specifications without the baselines, and then without the interaction terms. All the main substantive results remain essentially the same without the baselines. Without the interactions, the main variables remain substantively the same in terms of direction and significance, with only one variable, Republican Control, losing statistical significance in the voter ID model. Furthermore, as mentioned in the text, we greatly investigated other specifications for the party balance and party control variables. For example, we investigated the interactive effects of Democratic control with minorities' presence, or the effect of party control of governorship. The present specification for divided government and party control proved to be the better one at explaining our models.
In terms of general diagnostics we tested for multicollinearity, outliers, and general specification errors. To assess multicollinearity we examined simple correlations among independent variables and variance inflation factors (VIF) from running linear regression models with the dependent variables assumed to be continuous. We found that from all the pair-wise correlations of the independent variables (over 100 combinations), only four are greater than 0. All in all, with the restrictions of operating with an inevitably small number of observations though the complete universe of observations, we believe we have captured as best as possible the appropriate specification given the problem studied and the theories behind it. Note: Non-partisan Nebraska is not included in the analysis.
